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Rodrigue, that contributory negligence is not a defense to strict
liability actions in Louisiana, is not followed in Louisiana's future
jurisprudence.
Thomas G. Smart
WHAT'S IN A NAME? - LOUISIANA'S "PROTECTION" OF TRADENAMES:
Elle, Ltd. v. Elle Est
The plaintiff, Elle, Ltd., a Louisiana corporation' engaged in the
sale of women's clothing, claimed violations of the principles of
unfair competition and tradename infringement.' The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant,3 a nearby clothing store, from using
the word "elle" in its tradename. The Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, while criticizing its own decision,' adhered to
precedent 5 and denied injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court decision and held that the word
"elle" was a common noun and as such could not be protected by
injunction absent a showing of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
Elle, Ltd. v. Elle Est, 388 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
A tradename is a word, name, or symbol used to distinguish one
business from another.' The federal government and some states, in-
cluding Louisiana, allow by statute the reservation of tradenames.'
1. Elle, Ltd. was incorporated on May 17, 1977, in Book 318 of the Secretary of
State of the State of Louisiana.
2. The name "Elie, Ltd." was trademarked in June, 1977, pursuant to the re-
quirements of LA. R.S. 51:212-18 (Supp. 1968).
3. Elle Est reserved its tradename on June 25, 1979.
4. No. 79-12656 (D. La. Oct. 17, 1979). Judge Plotkin felt that the jurisprudence
was clear, Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 1007, 169 So. 2d 77, 80 (1964), that
in Louisiana, a plaintiff must establish the defendant's fraudulent intent in order to
obtain an injunction. However, he suggested that the supreme court reconsider the
standards set forth in Straus and adopt the more reasonable approach of allowing in-
junctive relief upon a showing of public confusion.
5. Louisiana courts consistently have held that the prerequisite for granting
relief to the plaintiff is proof of fraud on the part of the defendant. The reigning case
in this area is Straus Frank Co. v. Brown, 246 La. 999, 1007, 169 So. 2d 77, 80 (1964).
6. Tradenames are to be distinguished from trademarks in that the latter are
used to identify goods made or sold by the owner. See LA. R.S. 51:211(A)&(D) (Supp.
1968).
7. The federal treatment of trademarks and tradenames may be found in what is
generally called the "Lanham Act." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
Louisiana allows reservation of tradenames (ie., registration with the Secretary of
State) under trademark law and corporate law. See LA. R.S. 51:213 (Supp. 1968); 12:23
(Supp. 1968).
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Coupled with the rights of reservation are certain protections
against infringement However, protection is not predicated upon
registration.' The unregistered businessman is afforded the same
remedies under the general law of unfair competition. The law of un-
fair competition has been jurisprudentially developed in all jurisdic-
tions10 and is considered a broader area of the law than statutory
tradename infringement." In most jurisdictions use of an unregis-
tered tradename constitutes a violation when the alleged unregis-
tered tradename "used by the plaintiff ... [is] so associated with its
goods that the use of the same or similar ... [name] by another com-
pany constitutes a representation that its goods come from the same
source." 2 Under both statutory law and unfair competition, an in-
junction will lie to restrain the unfair use, simulation, and appropria-
tion of another's name."
The threshold question in any tradename infringement action is
whether the name has been "acquired."" One acquires a tradename
through use. In other words, it is necessary that the plaintiff alleging
infringement demonstrate that he has used the name in association
with his business. Use is said to vest the owner with a proprietary
interest in the name, and only when such an interest has been es-
tablished will the name be considered viable and worthy of protec-
tion.'5
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125-27 (1976); LA. R.S. 51:222-23 (Supp. 1968); LA. R.S. 12:23(F)
(Supp. 1968).
9. It is well-settled that the reservation statutes confer only procedural
advantages and not substantive rights. See Couhig's Pestaway Co., Inc. v. Pestaway,
Inc., 278 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
10. In Louisiana the body of law was jurisprudentially developed under article
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Buyers & Traders Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 365 So. 2d
839, 841 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
11. Generally the same facts which would support an action for tradename infringe-
ment would also support an action for unfair competition. See Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap. & E. Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975).
12. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap. & E. Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1975), citing Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147
(2d Cir. 1956).
13. Albrecht v. Del Bondio, 188 La. 502, 177 So. 587 (1937). See generally W.
DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK" PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 770-78 (1936).
14. Acquisition is not to be confused with registration. Metalock Corp. v. Metal-
Locking of La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 814, 819 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). A registered
tradename must be used in association with the business:
15. See T. G. I. Fridays, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 405 F. Supp.
698 (M.D. La. 1975); Couhig's Pestaway Co., Inc. v. Pestaway, Inc., 278 So. 2d 519 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973); Metalock Corp. v. Metal-Locking of La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 814 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972); Robinson, Tradenames and Trademarks-State and Federa- Some
Random Observations, 22 LA. B.J. 179 (1974)
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If the name in question is unique or bears no relationship to the
business itself, the name is considered viable on a perfunctory show-
ing of use.' The owner will prevail upon a showing that his use
predated that of the defendant 7 and that he suffered or may suffer
measurable damage.'8 All jurisdictions have been quick to protect
names such as "Black & White,"'9 a scotch, "Karastan, ' ° rugs, and
"Marble Hall Branch,"2 ' a restaurant. However, most tradenames
are not so imaginative. For example, "Litter Basket,"' "Home
Beverage Service,"23  "Vision Center,""2 "Car Care Center,"' 25 and
"Pestaway"" automatically indicate the nature of their businesses.27
These names are termed "descriptive" and have long been the subject
of controversy in courts throughout the country."
All courts agree that descriptive words are in the public domain
and as such are insusceptible of true acquisition. ' Nevertheless,
16. See Dynasty Room, Inc. v. Whiskey-A-Go-Go, Inc., 186 So. 2d 402 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966).
17. This is also referred to as "priority of appropriation." See New Orleans
Checker Cabs v. Mumphrey, 205 La. 1083, 18 So. 2d 629 (1944); Metalock Corp. v.
Metal-Locking of La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 4th Cir: 1972); Boogie Kings v.
Guillory, 188 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Gallo v. Safeway Brake Shops of La.,
Inc., 140 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Credeur v. Jones, 46 So. 2d 325 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1950).
18. See Buyers and Traders Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 365 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1978); Huth v. Rosenweig, 27 So. 2d 742 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
19. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,. 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1963).
20. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Couri, 220 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
21. Marcev v. Mandich, 158 La. 15, 103 So. 389 (1925).
22. Sterling Prod. Co. v. Crest Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Mich. 1970). For
other examples of treatment by Lousiana courts, see Kelly Girl Serv., Inc. v. Roberts,
243 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. La. 1965); New Orleans Checker Cabs v. Mumphrey, 205 La.
1083, 18 So. 2d 629 (1944); Yellow Cab Co. of New Orleans v. Jones, 156 La. 837, 101
So. 216 (1924); Dynasty Room, Inc. v. Whiskey-A-Go-Go, Inc., 186 So. 2d 402 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966); Credeur v. Jones, 46 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
23. Home Beverage Serv. v. Baas, 210 La. 873, 28 So. 2d 481 (1947).
24. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979).
25. Car Care, Inc. v. D. H. Holmes Co., 160 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
26. Couhig's Pestaway Co., Inc. v. Pestaway, Inc., 278 So.o2d 519 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973).
27. See e.g., Tefas v. Gatzoulas, 17 La. App. 276, 135 So. 693 (2d Cir. 1931). The
words "Coney Island" were held descriptive of a lunch stand business. See also DryIce
Corp. of America v. La. Dry Ice Corp., 54 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286
U.S. 558 (1930).
28. For an excellent discussion of how to distinguish unique from descriptive
tradenames, see Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc. 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979).
29. In Home Beverage Serv. v. Baas, 210 La. 873, 28 So. 2d 481 (1947), the court
stated that "Itihe policy of this law (unfair competition) is to foster, not hamper, compe-
tition, and it permits a monopoly in the use of the trademark only when it has become
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theories have been developed under which descriptive names will be
afforded protection. In federal courts and at common law, if the
alleged owner can show that through extensive use and advertising
his name has come to be distinctly associated with his business and
merchandise, the name is said to have acquired a "secondary mean-
ing."3 "Out of the businessman's efforts and the public recognition
of this secondary meaning there arises a new property right which
will be entitled to protection."'" In these jurisdictions the existence
of a secondary meaning, coupled with a showing of public confusion
resulting from the similarity of the names, will satisfy the plaintiff's
burden of proof." Louisiana, however, has chosen a different standard.
Louisiana has always recognized the doctrine of secondary mean-
ing.3 However, once such a meaning has been established a claimant
also must show the defendant's malicious intent. The Louisiana
Supreme Court first articulated this criterion in Home Beverage
Service v. Baas.' The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
using the name "Victory Home Beverage Service" in the New
Orleans area. The court conceded that the plaintiff, having operated
in the New Orleans area for over eleven years and having expended
large sums in advertising, had established a secondary meaning
identifying his business. 5 However, the injunction was denied when
the plaintiff failed to show the defendant guilty of "unfair competi-
tion.""6
The supreme court's stance on unfair competition was later ar-
ticulated in Straus Frank Company v. Brown:" "[T]he threefold
object of the law in unfair competition cases is: (1) to protect the
honest trader in business which fairly belongs to him, (2) to punish
the dishonest trader who is taking his competitor's business away
by unfair means, and (3) to protect the public from deception ...."'
the absolute and exclusive property of the first user. A merely descriptive term can
never become such property." 210 La. at 885, 28 So. 2d at 484-85, quoting Barton v.
Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1924).
30. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc. 596 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1979); Kelly Girl
Serv., Inc. v. Roberts, 243 F. Supp. 225, 228 (E.D. La. 1965).
31. A secondary meaning is said to vest title in a name. See R. CALLMAN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADE-MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 77.1, at 340 (1970).
32. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc. 596 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1979).
33. See notes 23-27 & 31, supra.
34. 210 La. 873, 28 So. 2d 481 (1947).
35. 210 La. at 890, 28 So. 2d at 486.
36. Id.
37. 246 La. 999, 169 So. 2d 77 (1964). In Straus, the plaintiff, owner of Lake Auto
Parts, a Lake Charles corporation, sought to enjoin the defendant from naming his
Lake Arthur store (forty-five miles away) "Lake Auto Supply." 246 La. at 1002, 169 So.
2d at 78.
38. 246 La. at 1008, 169 So. 2d at 80-81. In applying these criteria to the facts at
hand, the supreme court found that: (1) the plaintiff failed to prove that he had lost
1392 [Vol. 41
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The court also clarified the burden of proof: "In this state it is a
prerequisite to injunctive relief that fraud be established on the
part of the defendant and the burden of establishing that fraud is
upon the plaintiff. The law has always been reluctant to presume
fraud." '39 Although this standard has been widely criticized,"0 it has,
nevertheless, been followed rigidly by the lower courts.'1
The instant case can properly be seen as an example of strict
adherence to the Straus standard. The appeals court held that "elle"
was a commonplace noun and as such could not be protected in the
absence of proof of fraudulent intent.'2 In light of the jurisprudence
following Straus,"3 the denial of the injunction was to be expected.
But, the rather scant opinion is truly shocking and disconcerting.
customers as a result of the defendant's business (ie., "Plaintiff needs no injunction");
(2) there was no showing of any unfairness on the part of the defendant; and (3) Lake
Arthur is a small town with a small consumer public, and there was no showing that
they were confused. 246 La. at 1009-11, 169 So. 2d at 81.
39. 246 La. at 1008, 169 So. 2d at 80.
40. "Under this rule (requiring fraudulent intent), the law of unfair competition
effectively swallows up the secondary meaning doctrine." Vision Center v. Opticks,
Inc. 596 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1979). "I am inclined to the view that the likelihood of
confusion, rather than actual fraud or misrepresentation, should be the proper
standard for granting injunctive relief, notwithstanding the language of Straus ......
Sadie's, Inc. v. Hitchcock, 363 So. 2d 1306, 1308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (Lemmon, J.,
concurring). "It is erroneous to hold that one who claims secondary meaning for his
tradename or trademark 'must prove fraud .... .' R. CALLMAN, supra note 32, at
343-44, quoting Home Beverage Serv. v. Baas, 210 La. 873, 884, 28 So. 2d 481, 484
(1946).
The discussion in the case [Straus] seems to indicate that the case was in reality
bottomed on the fact that plaintiff failed to show damages, ie, loss of business,
caused by confusion, the fact that the defendant had made no intentional
misrepresentation, plus the fact that because of the small size of the market there
was in fact no confusion .... [T]he Louisiana Supreme Court [in Straus] spoke too
broadly of the "prerequisite" on the part of the plaintiff to prove actual fraud ....
[T]he . . . Court could profitably consider overruling or tempering the statements
in [Straus]....
Robinson, supra note 15, at 186. "Injunctive relief is designed to prevent further injury
to the plaintiffs rights and to protect the public, and should not be governed by the
fraud or lack thereof on the part of the defendant." Martin & Springgate, Protection of
a Businessman's Proprietary Information, 32 LA. L. REV. 497, 526 n.125 (1972). "[Tlhe
standards of [the supreme court] set forth in Straus Frank Co. v. Brown [make] it vir-
tually impossible to successfully prove unfair competition without concrete evidence of
intentional misrepresentation." Elle, Ltd. v. Elle Est, No. 79 -12565 (D. La. Oct. 17,
1979).
41. See Elle, Ltd. v. Elie Est, 388 So. 2d 1166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Buyer's and
Trader's Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 365 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Sadie's, Inc. v.
Hitchcock, 363 So. 2d 1306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Metalock Corp. v. Metal-Locking of
La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 262 La. 189, 262 So. 2d
788 (1972).
42. 388 So. 2d at 1167.
43. See cases at note 41, supra.
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The appeals court pronounced, "[w]e follow Straus,"" and yet made
no effort to establish secondary meaning or unfair competition or to
apply the Straus standard to the facts at hand. In fact, many perti-
nent facts present in the record are conspicuously absent in the
opinion. The court failed to acknowledge that: (1) the clothing stores
are approximately one mile apart as opposed to the forty-five mile
distance in Straus; (2) the plaintiff, Elle, Ltd., expended over $20,000
in advertising in the New Orleans area; (3) Straus was unable to prove
damage (ie., either reduction in the volume of business, loss of
customers, or confusion), whereas Elle, Ltd. was able to produce
over twenty sworn affidavits from customers attesting to their con-
fusion; and (4) the defendant, Elle Est, adopted a logo very similar
to that of Elle, Ltd. In view of these facts which distinguish Elle
from Straus,'5 it is difficult to understand the appeals court's deter-
mination of contextual similarity.'6 Perhaps acknowledgement of
these facts would have made Straus a far more uncomfortable prece-
dent.
The court did, however, attempt to temper its holding by ex-
plaining and liberalizing the Straus standard. The following
hypothetical situation was presented: "Straus would not support [an
"Elle"] (however innocently or ignorantly named) in the next block
from the earlier ["Elle"], notwithstanding absence of proof of intent
(beyond that arising from the name itself in such proximity)."'
7
Straus simply does not support this conclusion. The standard is far
more rigid than the appeals court suggests. Proof of fraud is not
predicated on geographic location; it is required and will not be
presumed.'8 It is submitted that under the unyielding holding of
Straus, these two stores on the same block would be forced to co-
exist absent the necessary proof of fraud. This cannot be considered
fair competition.
This example underscores the major problem in Louisiana law of
tradename infringement. Louisiana's law is based on a distorted
view of the law of unfair competition. Requiring that the establish-
44. 388 So. 2d at 1166.
45. See notes 37-38, supra.
46. 388 So. 2d at 1167.
47. Id. at 1166.
48. See text at note 39, supra.
49. It is generally accepted that the law of unfair competition first surfaced at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The doctrine is a judicial creation designed to
protect both businessmen and consumers from unfair trade practices. See W. DEREN-
BURG, supra note 13, at 40-41. See generally R. CALLMAN, supra note 32, at § 77. In the
earliest tradename cases the courts indicated support for the notion of free competi-
tion as opposed to fair competition. Their noninterventionist stance was especially
evident in the treatment of descriptive tradenames. Since the courts refused to
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ment of secondary meaning be coupled with a proof of fraud supports
the notions of "free" play rather than "fair" play. Fraud is perhaps
one of the most difficult burdens of proof to sustain. In tradename
cases this burden is usually insurmountable. ° Therefore, descriptive
tradename protection in Louisiana is essentially nonexistent. The
time has come for the courts to adopt a more reasonable and attain-
able standard.
One of the most realistic approaches to descriptive tradename
protection has been expounded by the federal courts.' Infringement,
as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 114(1), is predicated upon whether the simi-
larity of the names is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive."52 The basic factors to be considered in determining
confusion are: (1) the degree of similarity between the names; (2)
similarity of the services for which the name is used; (3) the area
and manner of use; (4) the degree of care expected to be exercised
by consumers; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the strength of the
plaintiffs showing of secondary meaning; and (7) the alleged in-
fringer's intent. 3 Federal cases which stand for the principle that
confusion and not fraud is the proper basis for injunctive relief are
legion. 4 Had the noted case been considered in light of this federal
standard, secondary meaning and confusion clearly existent, the
plaintiffs name would have been protected.
recognize any property rights in a descriptive name, the rule became fixed "that an ac-
tual fraudulent intent was an indispensable prerequisite for equitable protection ...."
W. DERENBURG, supra note 13, at 41. As the character of business evolved, the un-
fairness of this approach became apparent, and the need for a new standard resulted
in the development of the secondary meaning doctrine. Secondary meaning became a
vehicle whereby descriptive tradenames could be protected through a finding of pro-
prietary interest.
The development of the doctrine ol secondary meaning has signaled a retreat from
the requirement of proof of fraud, and the basis of the doctrine of unfair competition
has come to support fair play and to promote business integrity. See generally, id., at
28-159.
50. See cases at note 41, supra.
51. This standard was suggested for adoption by Judge Plotkin in the noted case.
52. (Emphasis added). This statute is part of the Federal Trademark Act,
commonly known as the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1976). The intent of the
Lanham Act, as expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1127, is "to regulate commerce within the
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in
such commerce . . .[and] to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition ...." To effectuate this intent Congress created a civil cause of action
allowing injunctive relief in cases of infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 114(1) (1976).
53. James Burrough Ltd. v. Lesher, 309 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ind. 1969). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
54. E.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1979);
Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1970); Polo
Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Products, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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The Louisiana infringement statute is basically indentical to the
federal statute." Therefore, adoption of the federal standard seems
not only reasonable, but also legislatively sanctioned." Unfortu-
nately, Louisiana courts have chosen to ignore the similarity of the
statutes and the federal treatment of this matter and to continue to
consider proof of fraud as the paramount issue in any tradename
case. It is urged that the supreme court reevaluate the position of
Straus and develop a more reasonable standard in keeping with the
spirit of the unfair competition doctrine.
Paula Katherine Woodson
55. LA. R.S. 51:222(1) (Supp. 1968): "[U]se [which] is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive .. .[shall be actionable]."
56. Sadie's, Inc. v. Hitchcock, 363 So. 2d 1306, 1308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976)
(Lemmon, J., concurring).
